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I. INTRODUCTION
Little attention has been paid to the role, or even the existence,
of judicial or semijudicial institutions as agencies of imperial control
in the literature on imperialism. Nor has much attention been given
to the long-range effects of judicial decisions by imperial courts.
Yet, at least for the British Empire, these decisions seem to have
been one of the more important means of keeping the empire intact.
The Privy Council's exercise of the semijudicial power of disallowing
colonial statutes is an important aspect of imperial control; another
aspect lies in the appellate jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council. The purpose of this article is to provide the
beginning of an evaluation of the Judicial Committee's performance
in this role through a survey of some of the major cases which it
decided.
The Judicial Committee was created in 1833 as the statutory
successor to a series of earlier imperial courts which had existed as
adjuncts, to the Privy Council under royal ukase. It was composed
of English (and later some colonial) high court judges who were
members of the Privy Council, and it could, subject to statutory
regulation, review on appeal any case from any colony. As the colo-
nies gained a greater degree of self-government during the nine-
teenth century, the scope of the Committee's jurisdiction narrowed.
As the colonies became Commonwealth nations, it disappeared al-
together for many of them. The Committee still exists, but the
number and variety of cases it hears has declined drastically, as
have the number of colonial or Commonwealth units which still
permit appeal to it.'
* The organization, personnel, and modes of operation of the Judicial Committee are
surveyed in my article, "The Judicial Committee: its Development, Organization and Proce-
dure," 1975 Pus. L. 219. Its impact on local constitutional development is surveyed in my
article "The Judicial Committee and the Development of Judicial Review," 24 AM. J. COMP.
L. 22 (1976). I wish to acknowledge gratefully the generosity of the National Endowment for
the Humanities, which provided a grant for the research upon which these articles are based.
** Chairman of the Department of Political Science, University of Georgia; B.A., Mon-
mouth College, 1946; M.A., University of Chicago, 1948; Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1949.
There is no adequate existing history of the Judicial Committee or its predecessor agen-
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II. FEDERATED SYSTEMS
The creation of the Judicial Committee in 1833 coincided with a
rapid development of the institutions of self-government in the Bri-
tish colonies which remained after the defection of the United
States or which were acquired shortly thereafter. These, sometimes
called the "old" colonies, consisted primarily of Canada, the West
Indian islands, New Zealand, Australia, India, Burma and Ceylon.
The Committee was confronted therefore with many of the same
problems its predecessor had faced with regard to the thirteen colo-
nies. These problems were so successfully handled that the Empire
remained intact for another century, and all the "old" colonies ex-
cept Burma kept their Commonwealth ties for considerable periods
even after gaining full independence. Apparently because London
had sufficiently learned the lessons of the eighteenth century, no
further full scale wars of independence were needed in the 1930's
and 1940's when the "old" colonies secured independence. Inde-
pendence for the four English-speaking areas was obtained through
a civil method-the mere passage of an act of Parliament, like the
Statute of Westminister in 1932-whenever enough pressure accu-
mulated in the colonies to convince the home authorities that it
would be wise to grant independence. Unrest and violence occurred
on the Indian subcontinent, but even there it did not develop into
war. When independence finally came to the area, the major prob-
lem was not whether to grant independence but rather how the vast
area involved should be organized; that is, how many national units
should be created. The separate independence of Burma and Ceylon
was no doubt a foregone conclusion, but the separation of Pakistan
(physically divided into two quite different areas) from the rest of
India was not.
The performance of the Judicial Committee was so effective that
the English-speaking colonies, with the exception of the Irish Free
State, chose to retain appeal to the Committee considerably longer
than was legally necessary. While Canada eventually abolished the
right of appeal in 1949, New Zealand, Australia (in part), and most
cies. The best work concentrates on the period before 1833 and on the American colonies. See
F. SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (1950). There is also
valuable material for the post-1833 period in W. F. FINLASON, THE HISTORY, CONSTITUTION,
AND CHARACTER OF THE JUDICIAL COMMITrEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL (1878), and in FITZROY, THE
HISTORY OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL (1928). I have surveyed the institutional development of the
Committee in "The Judicial Committee: its Development, Organisation and Procedure,"
1975 PUB. L. 219.
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of the West Indies retain it even today.
From 1833 to 1950 the bulk of the cases heard by the Committee
came from the old colonies-most of them from the Indian subconti-
nent, Canada and Australia respectively. The number of cases from
India and Canada was substantial, certainly enough to form an
important part of their developing jurisprudence. The same was
true of Australia until 1901 when the present constitution was
adopted. Thereafter the number of cases decreased rapidly and such
cases as were heard are not a very large part of Australian law, with
the exception of infrequent constitutional issues. Generally, the
Committee's influence on development in New Zealand and the
West Indies was not as great as in Australia. The only apparent
reasons for this difference are those of the size of the territory and
variety of their populations.
Some numerical data may be at least partially revealing, al-
though difficulties of classification prevent complete accuracy. The
following table nevertheless is somewhat instructive.
Classification of cases Canada Australia
(appeal ended (through 1971)
ca. 1950)
Business law 194 125
Constitutional law 157 45
Tax law 61 74
Land & water law 56 55
Family law 54 45
Public law 46 66
Negligence 31 11
Jurisdictional & other
legal matters 61 42
Other 81 44
TOTAL 741 507
As in the United States, much of the basic law of both Canada
and Australia is state or provincial law. It will not be surprising,
then, that most of the cases came either directly from the highest
courts of the states or provinces, or indirectly from them through the
Canadian Supreme Court or the Australian High Court. This fact
serves to emphasize the fundamental character of the Privy Coun-
cil's influence on legal development, since in such decisions the
Judicial Committee was directly influencing the most basic areas of
the legal system.
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In attempting even briefly to analyze these figures certain factors
are striking. One is the strong, but not surprising, emphasis on
questions concerning business and property. The figures tend to
understate the commercial questions, for many tax, land, negli-
gence, constitutional and "other" cases involved these same inter-
ests. The old idea of the existence of a strictly laissez-faire economic
system even in England has long been eroded, and these data indi-
cate that the same is true for Canada and Australia. Private enter-
prise has always depended heavily on a supportive framework of
favorable law. The table does not indicate how many of the deci-
sions were favorable to private property interests or, even in total,
what the net effect was on the developing economic systems of two
initially primitive countries which had rich natural resources avail-
able for development. The common law system was favorable to
private property rights and its adoption in both countries made the
development of economic systems somewhat parallel to that of the
British Isles inevitable. The effect of the Judicial Committee's deci-
sions was to foster and maintain this parallelism.
A favorite criticism of Canadian writers has been that the Com-
mittee's decisions were pro-provincial rights. However, investiga-
tion of the constitutional cases makes plausible an alternative thesis
that the decisions were pro-laissez-faire; that is, that they expressed
the judges' economic convictions rather than their attitudes toward
the nature of Canadian federalism. This tendency, if it existed at
all, would inevitably have been modified by the same judges' forced
(and yet real) attachment to the idea of parliamentary supremacy,
which made it difficult for them to use constitutional provisions to
prevent governmental regulation of business. Therefore they could
not have, even if they so desired, emulated the Supreme Court of
the United States in its pre-1937 laissez-faire stage.
A few cases will illustrate these points. Perhaps the closest the
judges ever came to admitting the use of economic theory to support
constitutional doctrine appears in Lord Haldane's judgment in In
re Board of Commerce Act,2 holding the Canadian antitrust laws of
1919 unconstitutional. He held that the laws interfered seriously
with property and civil rights which were constitutionally under the
protection of the provincial governments. He further held that there
was no emergency which would justify exceptional measures; and
that the imposition of criminal penalties on those who formed trusts
2 [19221 1 A.C. 191 (P.C.) (Can.).
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was unconstitutional, since antitrust laws were not within "the
domain of criminal jurisprudence." 3 He concluded: "[T]heir Lord-
ships do not find any evidence that the standard of necessity re-
ferred to has been reached, or that the attainment of the end sought
is practicable, in view of the distribution of legislative powers en-
acted by the Constitutional act. . ."
It would have been as easy to rationalize a decision holding that
the laws did not infringe on property and civil rights and that (as
the judges found in several other cases) the standard as to what is
criminal is what the Parliament sees fit to make criminal.5 Lord
Haldane reverted to the same theme in 1925 when he stated that
Parliament cannot make something constitutional by treating it as
criminal unless it is criminal by its very nature. He did not explain
how one determines what is criminal by its very nature and the
doctrine was apparently dropped soon after his death.6
Judicial rhetoric in such cases, especially in English practice, is
perforce confined to the constitutional text. Since the constitution
embodies a scheme of federalism, not an economic theory, it is the
judges' theories of federalism which have gained attention. It is
difficult to "prove" judicial motivations, particularly in Britain
where judges are not supposed to have policy preferences and where
secrecy among judges is common. Decisions, at least until the last
few decades, were expected to flow automatically out of the legal
text with the judge acting merely as a neutral mouthpiece. But the
pattern of decisions in Canadian cases, especially the Committee's
reaction to the "Canadian New Deal" during the great depression
of the 1930's, was too much like the American experience to escape
notice, particularly since the Canadian constitution differs substan-
tially from that of the -United. States.
Id. at 199. This was true even though the national government controls criminal law.
Id. at 201.
3 Indeed, in 1937 a differently constituted Committee upheld a fair trade practices law
despite the fact that it, too, used criminal penalties. Lord Atkin swept aside Haldane's fear
of adding to the "domain of criminal jurisprudence" by almost saying that anything could
be made criminal: he refused to look at the motives of Parliament, merely saying that there
was "no reason for supposing that the Dominions are using the criminal law as a pretence or
pretext," for invading the Provincial legislative field. Attorney-General for Brit. Colum. v.
Attorney-General for Can. [1937] A.C. 368, 376 (P.C.). Similarly, the Committee found
warrant for upholding federal pilotage laws even though they trenched upon property and
civil rights. Paquet v. Corproation of Pilots, (1920] A.C. 1029 (Can.). See also Priority
Articles Trade Ass'n v. Attorney-General for Can., [19311 A.C. 310 (P.C.) (a later antitrust
law upheld).
' See note 4. See also, as another instance of Haldane's attitude, Attorney-General for Ont.
v. Reciprocal Insurers, [19241 A.C. 328 (P.C.) (insurance regulation).
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CONSTITUTIONAL
CANADA
DECISIONS ON FEDERALISM AND
LAISSEZ-FAIRE
1875 to 1954
1875- 1913- 1933-
1912 1932 1954 Tota
Pro-provincial-rights,
pro-laissez-faire:
Anti-provincial-rights,
pro-laissez-faire:
Pro-provincial-rights,
anti-laissez-faire:
Anti-both:
Total
Total pro-provincial-rights:
Total pro-laissez-faire:
4 7 4 15
9 11 8 28
5 9 8 22
6 7 5 18
24 34 25 83
37
43
Can any light be shed on the question of judicial motivation by
looking at the political affiliations of the judges? The Judicial Com-
mittee members sitting in the antitrust case, In re Board of Com-
merce Act,7 were Lords Haldane, Buckmaster, Cave, Phillimore and
Carson. Haldane does not seem to have been especially conserva-
tive; he was a Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) for 25 years, and
was considered liberal enough to serve as Lord Chancellor in the
short-lived Labour Government of 1924. Buckmaster, another Lib-
eral and former Lord Chancellor, was disliked by the Conservative
Dunedin apparently because of his liberal political views. Philli-
more had no public political record. Lord Cave served as a Unionist
MP, a Cabinet member during the First World War, and Lord
Chancellor in the Conservative governments of 1922-1924 and 1924-
1927. Lord Carson was most famous as the leader of the Ulster
Unionists, but he was also an English Solicitor General in the Con-
servative Government from 1896 to 1905, and a Cabinet member
during World War I. It is difficult to detect a pattern in these scat-
tered bits of information, although additional research would proba-
1 1 A.C. 191 (P.C.) (Can.).
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bly reveal more. In any case, English political attitudes' often con-
cern controversies which are very different from those in any of the
dependencies, and thus the English politics of the judges provide
only tantalizing clues as to how they would view Canadian prob-
lems.
The Judicial Committee also showed a tendency to become mired
in fruitless controversies on constitutional issues, reminiscent of the
United States Supreme Court attempts to draw a line between di-
rect and indirect effects on interstate commerce. In Canada this
took the form of the so-called "pith-and-substance" rule. An exam-
ple of the rule is provided by Alberta's attempt to help the
mortgage-ridden farmers during the depression. The Judicial Com-
mittee held that the province's Debt Adjustment Act of 1937 was
unconstitutional because it was "in pith and substance" in relation
to insolvency, a matter which is constitutionally under the control
of the national government under the bankruptcy clause.' However,
a prior case had upheld an Ontario law concerning assignments and
preferences by insolvent persons, using the argument that it was
"merely ancillary" to bankruptcy law, not in relation to it. n° It is
difficult to see the difference in the two cases. In effect the Judicial
Committee seems to have constructed two distinct sets of preced-
ents which could be used as preferred, a situation in which it could,
if it wished, use economic doctrine to sway the decision.
The two most obvious areas of private law in which the Privy
Council decisions have had profound impact on local law have been
those of inheritance law and negligence. The 37 succession and 31
negligence cases from Canada (42 and 11 respectively from Aus-
tralia) by their numbers alone seem to indicate that the Committee
deeply influenced legal development in these areas. Perhaps of more
importance is the fact that these were basically common law areas,
in which court decisions were the law." The importance of judicial
Hughes, a rather biased Irish observer, has claimed very specifically that the Judicial
Committee is "the representative of either large vested interests or monied interests, particu-
larly in England." This has worked against "the litigant who is either a Dominion person or
a poor person or firm." He further charges that the British government (especially Austen
Chamberlain) regarded the right of appeal to the Committee as a safeguard for British
investors. H. HUGHES, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND JUDICIAL AUTONOMY IN THE BRITISH COMMON-
WEALTH OF NATIONS 99 (1931).
Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Can., [1943] A.C. 356 (P.C.).
Attorney-General for Ont. v. Attorney-General for Can., [18941 A.C. 189 (P.C.).
Lederman, The Common Law System in Canada, in CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE 34 (E.
McWhinney ed. 1958); and Bawker, Succession to Property in the Common Law Provinces,
CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE 260 (E. McWhinney ed. 1958).
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interpretation of the law was not as fundamental in areas where only
the meaning of statutory law was at issue. Due to the economic
importance of taxes, an area dependent on statutory law, there were
many cases concerning them (61 from Canada and 74 from Aus-
tralia).
Another means of gauging the influence of the Judicial Commit-
tee is to determine the number and proportion of reversals and
affirmances of lower court decisions. A reversal signifies some degree
of disagreement over the meaning or application of law, and the
hierarchical character of the judicial system means that the lower
courts must accept the Committee's decisions unless they are
changed legislatively. While some cases are difficult to classify, the
figures are accurate enough to indicate that the Committee had a
very significant impact.
AFFIRMATIVE/ REVERSAL
(1829 to 1971)
Canada: 390 312
Australia: 278 212
India-Burma-Ceylon: 1472 1068
West Indies: 83 107
New Zealand: 65 42
The reversal rate is far higher than one would have expected. It
has not only been high for all of the countries studied, but has
remained high in all periods. Nevertheless, there is a degree of peri-
odicity: for Australia, reversals ran as high as 50% for the period
1901-1920; for New Zealand, for the period 1898 to 1904; for India,
for the period 1836 to 1871; for Canada, close to 50% for the period
1901 to 1920; and for the West Indies, well over 50% from 1829 to
1905. These periods do overlap to some degree, which makes it prob-
able that the composition of the Judicial Committee, particularly
in the years just after the turn of the century, may have had some-
thing to do with the rate of reversals. In any case, one can assume
that reversals force legal development in directions desired by the
Committee rather than by the jurisdiction from which the cases
came.
In order to assess the significance of these figures precisely, the
reversal rates for different types of cases from Canada and Australia
have been checked.
[Vol. 7:47
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Canada Australia
Affirm. Revers. Affirm. Revers.
Constitutional Law: 99 54 25 12
Public Law: 32 19 44 22
Legal practice: 24 21 12 17
Private Law: 235 218 197 161
While the reversal rate is surprisingly high in each category, it is
lower in the two areas of constitutional and public law, in which one
would expect British courts to defer to the judgment of legislatures,
and it is highest for those in which the Committee exercises a super-
visory function over the lower courts. Perhaps the most significant
"finding" is that the rate runs close to 50% in private law cases.
Those cases allow the Committee to exert maximum impact on the
development of social and economic institutions; a position of which
it has apparently taken full advantage.
Still another possible measure of Judicial Committee influence
lies in the number of provincial or national laws or other governmen-
tal acts found to be constitutionally invalid. Many such cases are
in fact affirmances of lower court decisions, but nevertheless they
stand as means by which the Committee can negate, with partial
success, policy deliberately adopted by a commonwealth legislature
or executive. Since the adoption of such laws often expresses the
legislative judgment of what the constitution means, court decisions
invalidating them force constitutional growth in directions not de-
sired by the contemporary legislatures. Of course, one must keep in
mind that often federal system cases involve one or several states
actually in conflict with the national legislature or with other states,
so that the Judicial Committee decisions in such cases seldom (if
ever) represent a reversal of a unanimously accepted policy; rather,
they constitute a choice between two or more policies desired by
differing local constituencies.
The number of times the Judicial Committee has invalidated
laws or other acts is of interest, and the figures do not show any
hesitation on the part of the Committee to take such action. For
Canada, 47 state acts and 16 federal acts were found unconstitu-
tional from 1867 to 1954. For Australia, keeping in mind the re-
stricted access to the Privy Council, five state and four federal acts
have been invalidated since the present constitution was adopted in
1901. The total number of constitutional cases is 153 and 37 respec-
tively, so the proportions are quite high, much higher than in the
United States. Thus tabular data indicate that the Judicial Com-
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mittee has played an enormously significant role in constitutional
development in Canada and Australia.
III. UNITARY SYSTEMS
The Privy Council has played no such role in constitutional devel-
opment, in contrast to legal development in India, the West Indies,
or New Zealand, as it has in Canada and Australia. This is not due
to the lack of written constitutional documents, but to the unitary
systems of government present in each of the West Indian countries,
New Zealand, Ceylon, and pre-independence India, Pakistan and
Burma. While there have been occasional constitutional cases from
these areas, they are neither numerous nor significant.
A. West Indies
Such insignificance in the constitutional area for the West Indies
is compounded by the fact that there were many autonomous juris-
dictions. Since 1833 there have been no more than three constitu-
tional cases from any single jurisdiction. The bulk of the cases arose
before their governments assumed their modern shape. Thus, an
1841 case denying the Governor of St. Lucia the power to appoint
temporary judges has no modem force. 2 Nor does another denying
the Governor of Berbice power to act outside the authority of his
commission. 3 In Grenada the legislative assembly was denied the
power of removing the Chief Justice; 4 the London agent for British
Honduras could not be paid because the colonial government had
not observed the proper constitutional forms; 5 and, in a decision
with perhaps wider repercussions, the legislature of Dominica had
no power to punish for contempt analogous to the power of the
House of Commons unless that power had been given to it ex-
pressly. 6 This case was decided despite an earlier holding that the
Jamaican legislature did have such power.'9 Another Jamaican case
emphasized the limitations on the power of governors, holding that
a governor is not a Viceroy and does not possess general sovereign
power beyond the express or implied terms of his commission. 8
Gahan v. Lafitte, 13 Eng. Rep. 155 (P.C. 1841-1842) (St. Lucia).
'3 Cameron v. Kyte, 12 Eng. Rep. 678 (P.C. 1835) (Berbice).
Grenacla v. Sanderson, 13 Eng. Rep. 596 (P.C. 1847).
Hodge v. Attorney-General for Brit. Hond., 15 Eng. Rep. 924 (P.C. 1864).
IS Doyle v. Falconer, [1865-1867] L.R. 1 P.C. 328 (Dominica).
Beaumont v. Barrett, 12 Eng. Rep. 733 (P.C. 1836) (Jamaica).
Musgrove v. Pulido [1879-1880] 5 A.C. (P.C.) (Jamaica).
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Such decisions were important because they demonstrated the way
in which the Judicial Committee would use its power, and also
because they "fleshed out" the constitution as it then existed, even
if they now have only historical significance.
There have been several recent cases from the West Indies. Flying
in the face of American decisions, the Committee recently held in
King v. The Queen,19 that after an illegal search and seizure under
the Jamaica constitution, the evidence so obtained may still be
admissible in court at the discretion of the judge, since it was not
"a case in which evidence has been obtained by conduct of which
the Crown ought not to take advantage. 20 This is surely a cryptic
statement of a somewhat doubtful doctrine, and perhaps illustrative
of the defects of using a common law court to decide constitutional
issues.
An appeal from Trinidad and Tobago raised the question of
whether acting Supreme Court judges could constitutionally act as
judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Privy Council decided
to allow such action.2' Another case reminiscent of American consti-
tutional issues arose where unions were challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Industrial Stabilization Act of 1965, which had im-
posed compulsory arbitration and prohibited strikes in violation of
the act. 2 The union claimed that the law violated the constitutional
freedom of association, sanctioned illegal right of entry, and allowed
unfair trials based on secret information. The Judicial Committee
pointed out that the act did not interfere with the freedom to asso-
ciate, a freedom which could not be equated with the freedom to
bargain collectively and to strike; that the law as to right of entry
had been amended; and that there was no general constitutional
principle prohibiting the use of secret information in trials. Lord
Donovan concluded that "any alleged wrongful exercise" of the
power to admit secret information could itself be tested on appeal.23
This was perhaps the most important modern case from the West
Indies involving a constitutional issue.
The modern West Indian cases, though not numerous, reflect
important constitutional issues. But as pointed out elsewhere, when
the Judicial Committee decides such cases against the local govern-
" [1969] 1 A.C. 304 (P.C.) (Jamaica).
" Id. at 319.
21 Butler v. The King, [19391 A.C. 484 (P.C.) (Trinidad and Tobago).
" Collymore v. Attorney-General, [1970] A.C. 538 (P.C.) (Trinidad and Tobago).
21 Id. at 551.
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ment, it is almost inviting that government to withdraw the review
power from the Committee.
B. New Zealand
The Privy Council also contributed little to the development of
the New Zealand Constitution, although the cases are more recent
and seem to involve more significant questions. One case held that
the Governor can appoint Supreme Court judges only when an as-
certainable salary is payable by law at the time of appointment; this
was apparently on the assumption that unless the legislature had
made such provisions, the position did not really exist.24 When the
legislature authorized judicial proceedings on persons absent from
New Zealand, the Committee upheld the act.25 Later the Committee
held that the New Zealand Constitution inherits the British consti-
tutional principle that public moneys cannot officially be spent
without a "distinct authorization" from the New Zealand Parlia-
ment .2
A more recent New Zealand case Tukino v. Aotea District Maori
Land Board,2 is also of some importance. Here the Judicial Com-
mittee upheld a law changing the status of Maori lands which were
protected by treaty. The Committee held that the courts are bound
by such law, and cannot go behind its terms to find out why it was
enacted. Further, it was held that courts cannot enforce treaty
rights, since treaties are not law (or at least, if law, they are subordi-
nate to statutes). Despite the treaty, the New Zealand legislature
had the same power to change native land law as the British Parlia-
ment would have had.28 This is legislative supremacy with a venge-
ance, perhaps inevitable in a system where the executive can con-
clude treaties without legislative assent. Any other decision would
enable the executive to become supreme by concluding treaties on
domestic subjects which would then be untouchable by legislation.
But probably the most significant influence from England is not
specifically attached to Privy Council decisions directly applicable
to New Zealand. It rests instead on the doctrine, apparently fol-
lowed rigidly, that all Privy Council decisions (even those from
other jurisdictions) must be followed in New Zealand; further, that
2 Buckley v. Edwards, [1892] A.C. 387 (P.C.) (N. Z.).
2 Ashbury v. Ellis, [1893] A.C. 339 (P.C.) (N.Z.).
" Auckland Harbour Board v. The King, [19241 A.C. 318 (P.C.) (N.Z.).
- [1941] A.C. 308 (P.C.) (N.Z.).
29 Id.
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where not conflicting with Privy Council decisions, the New Zea-
land courts are "absolutely bound" by decisions of the British
House of Lords. Even more surprising, the doctrine dictates that
the New Zealand Court of Appeals will follow English appeals deci-
sions. 0 This practice apparently results from the principle in New
Zealand that "in all parts of the Commonwealth where the common
law prevails the interpretation of the law should be the same."', It
is followed so rigidly that "on occasion the most unconsidered dicta
of the highest English courts and of the Privy Council have been
scrupulously followed." 2 Such a doctrine means that the twists and
turns of English legal development are likely to be reproduced in
New Zealand without regard to differences in local needs and de-
sires. Whether such excessive attachment to the home country will
survive the loosening of the ties of commonwealth preference re-
mains to be seen.
C. Burma-Ceylon-India
Constitutional cases from Burma-Ceylon-India are more numer-
ous, but as with the West Indies, many of them are so old that their
effect has been superseded by later charters and constitutions. Only
two cases came from Burma, both in the twentieth century. One,
in 1912, held that the Burmese law of 1898 depriving the civil courts
of jurisdiction over the government in claims of rights to land was
in violation of the Government of India Act of 1858, the provisions
of which could not be repealed by any Indian legislature. The theo-
retical basis of the decision was that acts of the British Parliament
become supreme law for any colony to which they specifically
apply. 3 The other case upheld the assumption of legislative power
by the governor during the emergency of World War II and its after-
math, finding the governor's Special Judges' Act of 1943 valid.34 But
since independence Burma has adopted a new constitution, has
barred appeal to the Privy Council, and has become a military
dictatorship. While British law and British court decisions may
exercise a continuing influence in Burmese life, the constitutional
decisions are now invalid.
2 Cameron, The Judicial System, in NEW ZEALAND: THE DEvELOPmENT oF ITS LAWS AND
CoNsTrrUTrloN 103 (J. Robson ed. 1967).
Id. at 104.
1' Id. at 101.
32 Id. at 103.
Secretary of State v. Moment, [1912] 40 I.A. 48.
31 Chittambaram v. King-Emperor, [1947] A.C. 200 (P.C.) (Rangoon).
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Even though there were no constitutional cases of any importance
from Sri Lanka (Ceylon) before independence, the facts that (1) it
retained appeal to the Judicial Committee after independence; (2)
its constitution contains clauses attempting to protect minority lan-
guage groups; and (3) criminal appeals were not barred, has led to
a constant flow of cases not only in the constitutional, but also in
the general areas of the law. The first constitutional issue concerned
a law regulating voting rights, which the Tamil minority claimed
was discriminatory. The Privy Council found it constitutional on
the assumption that the discriminatory effect was not directed to-
ward the Tamils, per se.35 Some years later the Committee held that
appeal to it in criminal cases, since it was not specifically abolished
in the constitution, was still permissible."5
When the Sri Lanka legislature passed an act which amended the
constitution by changing the constitutional provisions as to ap-
pointment of government personnel, the Judicial Committee found
the law unconstitutional despite the Committee's general bias to-
ward parliamentary supremacy, holding that the legislature does
not have "the general power to legislate so as to amend its Constitu-
tion by ordinary majority resolutions."37 The Committee also held
that Ceylon's constitution requires the essentials of natural justice,
such as notice and hearing, to be observed in citizenship hearings,
since these are semijudicial proceedings.3 1
The government of Sri Lanka attempted to respond to an abortive
coup d'etat in 1962 by passing a measure legalizing ex post facto the
detention and prosecution of persons suspected of "offenses against
the state. ' 39 While the Judicial Committee did not feel that this law
was in itself contrary to natural justice, it found that it was a usur-
pation of the judicial power as granted in the Constitution, and thus
invalid .4
A third case regarding judicial power was decided in 1968. The
question considered was whether members of Sri Lanka's labor tri-
bunal are judicial officers. If so, they would presumably need to be
appointed by the process established for judges in the constitution.
" Pillai v. Mundanajoke [1953] A.C. 514 (P.C.) (Ceylon). The Tamils are an important
but minority language group, which the constitution makes special efforts to protect.
31 Ibralebbe v. The Queen, [1964] A.C. 900 (P.C.) (Ceylon).
3' Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe, [1965] A.C. 172, 198 (P.C.) (Ceylon).
31 Shareef v. Commissioner for Registration of Indian and Pakistani Residents, [19661
A.C. 47 (P.C.) (Ceylon).
" Liyanage v. The Queen, [1967] 1 A.C. 259, 279 (P.C.) (Ceylon).
a Id.
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The Judicial Committee found that they were not judicial officers
such as contemplated in the constitution.4 Finally, in a second case
regarding the amending power, the Committee held that it is the
process of amendment, not the title given to the action, that is
important. The legislature had used the proper amending procedure
for a measure imposing civic disabilities on public servants, includ-
ing members of the legislature, who had been indentified as bribe-
takers by a special commission of inquiry, but it had neglected to
label the measure as an amendment. The Committee held that if
the constitution was changed, the use of the proper procedures was
all that was necessary; the measure need not be properly named.2
Considering Sri Lanka's small size and the youth of its Constitu-
tion, a fair number of cases have been presented, and several of
them are obviously of great importance. It can thus be seen that the
Privy Council continues to play a large role in Sri Lanka's constitu-
tional development. It is, however, this very fact which may lead in
the future to the abolition of appeal to the Privy Council.
Both India and Pakistan abolished appeals to the Judicial Com-
mittee almost immediately upon gaining independence. For this
reason the Committee's constitutional decisions are formally dead,
although some of them doubtless live on in Indian constitutional
provisions (and, to a much lesser extent, in those of Pakistan as
well). The Indian Constitution incorporated judicial review, which
has been used with some effect.
The British East India Company had occupied areas at Bombay,
Calcutta and Madras long before 1800. These were for a time gov-
erned under separate charters, and until 1935 each had its own
Supreme Court from which cases flowed directly to the Privy Coun-
cil. (Other Supreme Courts were added in the course of the nine-
teenth century as Britain took control of more and more of India.)
These courts were originally company-dominated and company-
oriented, but by 1833 all three were using professional judges who
had attained a great deal of independence from the company. These
judges had gained such a reputation for fairness that Indians often
used them voluntarily in preference to native courts. The company
courts were finally abolished in 1861.13 As stated earlier, it was the
practice as early as 1840 to have at least one former "Indian" judge
, United Engineering Workers' Union v. Devanayajam, [1968] A.C. 356 (P.C.) (Ceylon).
4 Kariapper v. Wijesinha, [1968] A.C. 717 (P.C.) (Ceylon).
'2 See C. FAWCETT, THE FIRST CENTURY OF BRITISH JUSTICE IN INDIA (1934).
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sit on the Judicial Committee (he was always English until 1910),
and after the 1860's there were usually two or three. These judges
sat in all the Indian cases, which were numerous, but they at no
time formed a formally separate panel; they were always judges
with no Indian background sitting on Indian cases. Nevertheless,
the Committee's level of expertise in Indian matters was about as
high as it could have been.
Only a few nineteenth century constitutional cases need be men-
tioned. The 1823 Bombay charter withheld from the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction cases concerning revenue. When the question
whether quit-rents were revenue arose, the Judicial Committee held
that they were and that therefore the Supreme Court had no power
to try quit-rent cases." Later, the Committee confirmed the power
of the Calcutta Supreme Court to remove or suspend officers of the
court for misconduct, even when the misconduct was unconnected
with their jobs.4 5 Finally, the Committee upheld a law which ex-
cluded certain specified districts from the jurisdiction of the Cal-
cutta Supreme Court, upon the Lieutenant-Governor's discretion.
The Committee felt that, since this discretion was conditional
rather than delegated legislation, it was valid."
The successive acts of Parliament creating unified governments
for India in the twentieth century were also litigated. The Govern-
ment of India Act of 1935, although short-lived, was the subject of
many constitutional controversies, partly because of its complexity.
One important case, involving the age-old question of what powers
a government has in emergency situations, stemmed from the 1919
constitutional act. It raised the question of whether the Governor-
General has the emergency power to create special tribunals. In
upholding the power, the Judicial Committee gave the Governor-
General almost dictatorial powers: "[It cannot be disputed that
an emergency existed and that [the governor's actions] are for the
peace and good government. . . .Those are matters of which the
Governor-General is the sole judge; he is not bound to give any
reasons."
47
This decision undoubtedly reflected the judges' feeling that they
were dealing with a rebellious and fractious colony. Additionally,
British courts have always been reluctant to question the discretion
Spooner v. Juddon, 13 Eng. Rep. 682 (P.C. 1848-1850) (Bombay).
In re Grant, 13 Eng. Rep. 833 (P.C. 1850) (Bengal).
The Queen v. Burah, [1878] 3 App. Cas. 889 (P.C.) (Bengal).
,B Bhagat Singh v. Emperior, [1931] 58 I.A. 169, 131 A.I.R. 111 (P.C. 1931).
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of the executive; Liversidge v. Anderson,4" upholding detention
without trial in England during World War II, stands as the most
notorious case expounding this view, but there are many others.4"
The Irish decisions upholding the special courts under the Offences
against the State Act of 1940,5 are similar, as are the American
Japanese Exclusion Cases."' Nevertheless the cases are not entirely
analogous. The English and American cases came at a time when a
threat of invasion could have resulted in the actual extinction of the
state. The Irish cases involved internal matters; i.e., the threat of
civil insurrection and the possible substitution of one government
for another. The Indian case was both more understandable and less
justifiable, for it involved the natural opposition of a subject popula-
tion to the maintenance of colonial authority. The same question
was to arise under the 1935 constitutional act, and was to be decided
the same way.52 However, the latter holding was somewhat limited,
since the Committee in another case held that detention orders
under emergency legislation had to be issued by the Governor him-
self. Such orders could not be delegated in the form of police recom-
mendations, and the civil courts had a corresponding power to in-
vestigate the validity of detention orders. 3
Other constitutional issues under the Government of India Act of
1935 involved a variety of questions. Two cases concerned the tax
power. One held that the federal income tax could be imposed on
foreign companies if most of their income arose in India,54 an almost
inevitable conclusion, and one which doubtless still is valid in inde-
pendent India. The other involved the inevitable attempt to use the
complexities of a federal constitution to avoid taxation; the question
was whether a province had the constitutional power to impose a tax
on the first sale of manufactured goods. The Judicial Committee,
perhaps rather sophistically, held that as it was a tax on the goods
rather than on the sale or the proceeds of the sale (even though
unsold goods were not taxed), it was not an excise which would have
been restricted to the federal government; therefore the tax was
valid.5
-A [1942] A.C. 206 (P.C.).
4I Id.
In re Article 26 and the Offenses Against the State (Amendment) Bill, [1940] I.R. 470.
, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944).
12 King-Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma [19441 72 I.A. 57, [1945] A.C. 14 (P.C.) (India).
King-Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, [1945] 72 I.A. 241, 32 A.I.R. 156 (P.C. 1931).
Wallace Bros. & Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, [1947] 75 T.A. 87.
" Governor-General in Council v. Province of Madras, [1945172 I.A. 91, 32 A.I.R. 98 (P.C.
1945).
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This mildly states-rights attitude carried over into two of the land
cases. The United Provinces Tenancy Act of 1939 was found to be
valid even though it diminished the absolute rights to an estate held
under a preceding crown grant." A Punjabi debtors' relief law was
found to be limited to agricultural lands and was therefore within
the "land" control granted to the provinces constitutionally.57 But
in a third case a similar Punjabi law was struck down insofar as it
purported to have retroactive effect.58
As both the tax and land cases demonstrated, the chief constitu-
tional problem presented by the federal form of government, as was
true in Canada, was how to delineate a precise line between national
and provincial power. The Government of India Act of 1935 estab-
lished three "lists" to define power: powers of the national govern-
ment, powers of the provincial governments, and concurrent powers.
But the Judicial Committee found, in Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of
Commerce, Ltd.,59 as it had in Canada, that these lists did not
actually mark a clearcut line between the powers of the various
legislatures. Overlap was inevitable, and the Committee decided to
use the "pith and substance" rule which it had developed for Can-
ada to decide this case. Thus, the Bengal Money Lenders Act of
1940, which limited interest charges, was held to be valid "in pith
and substance" as dealing with moneylending and money lenders,
even though it "trenched incidentally" on promissory notes and
banking which were national powers.8 0 One might agree with Mr.
Justice Brandeis, who said in another connection that it was more
important to get the question settled than it was to get it settled
right. No doubt as long as India remains a real federal system, its
courts will be called upon to settle similar questions and it will use
or develop "rules" which have all the spurious precision of the "pith
and substance" rule.
It is clear that of the countries thus far surveyed the effect of
Judicial Committee decisions on constitutional development has
been minimal in most, and marginal at best in two, Sri Lanka and
5, Thakun Jagannath Baksh Singh v. The United Provinces, [1946] 73 I.A. 123, 33 A.I.R.
127 (P.C. 1946).
'7 Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia, [1947] I.A. 12, 34 A.I.R. 72 (P.C. 1947).
" Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh, [1946] 73 I.A. 59, 33 A.I.R. 66 (P.C. 1946).
' [1947] 74 I.A. 23, 34 A.I.R. 60 (P.C. 1947).
" Id.; see also Board of Commerce, Ltd. v. Amulya Krishna, [1947] 74 I.A. 45, 34 A.I.R.
66 (P.C. 1947).
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India. It is, of course, otherwise in the two "old colonies" not yet
discussed in detail, Canada and Australia.
IV. CANADA
Appeal to the Privy Council was regarded in Canada as a defense
of provincial power against the encroachments of Ottawa. Canadian
federalism takes its shape largely, if not solely, as a result of the
existence of French Quebec within the federation. Nevertheless, the
other provinces were not backward in pressing appeals beyond the
Canadian Supreme Court to Whitehall. Thus Canada became, after
India, the most prolific source of appeals.
There was a significant lack of consensus among the framers of
the British North America Act of 1867, Canada's constitution,
which left fertile ground for policymaking in the judgments of the
Privy Council. Indeed, such policymaking was not only inevitable
but necessary, if certainty was to be drawn from ambiguity. Thus,
their Lordships became the prime shapers of Canadian federalism
until after World War II. The influence of the Judicial Committee
on overseas constitutional development reached its apogee in Can-
ada. This was possible only because the Canadians had deep inter-
nal disagreements unlike the Australians, which led to an unwilling-
ness to trust any Canadian court to settle disputes about the work-
ing of the federal system. This job fell to the Judicial Committee
largely because it was the nearest thing to an impartial arbiter.
In 1949 the decision to abolish appeals to the Privy Council was
only in part the result of the growth of Canadian nationalism. It was
also made possible by an (unfortunately temporary) "era of good
feelings" between the French and the English populations, and even
more by the development of a degree of trust by the French in the
willingness and ability of the Canadian Supreme Court to protect
French status and interests. Nevertheless it is true that the heritage
of Canadian disunity continues, as evidenced by the inability to
agree upon a method of amending the British North America Act.
This makes it impossible to reverse court decisions by amendment
and thus places an even greater burden on the Supreme Court in
its use of judicial review. When a civil liberties protection act was
passed in 1960 it could only be passed as an ordinary act of Parlia-
ment, limited in effect to acts of the national legislature, and
amendable and reversible at will since it lacks the superior status
of a constitutional provision.
Before 1949 the shape of Canadian federalism had been pro-
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foundly influenced by Judicial Committee decisions in a manner
that will be difficult to erase quickly, especially because of the ab-
sence of easy amendment procedures and the continued reliance of
Canadian judges on precedent and on a statutory-interpretation
approach to the British North America Act. It would be easier to
evaluate the Committee's work if one knew what the Canadian con-
stitution means, but such knowledge is inhibited by the known dif-
ferences in opinion among its framers and, of course, by their inabil-
ity to foresee the kinds of questions that would develop in posterity.
Critics of the Committee's performance commonly assume that
there is a known meaning for the constitution, an assumption which
seems historically false. MacDonald, for instance, claims that the
British North America Act did not create a "true federal system but
a highly specialized kind of federalism" in which the federal govern-
ment was to play a dominant role.' If this were the unambigous
truth one would have to accept his judgment that the Judicial Com-
mittee misread the constitution. But in reality it is the very question
of the "kind of federalism" intended by the Act which has been the
focus of controversy. Various parties came to the framing sessions
with very diverse goals, and the result was, as in the American
Constitution, the inclusion of some particularly ambiguous clauses
such as the "peace, order and good government" clause and those
clauses dealing with the regulation of trade and commerce, prop-
erty, and civil rights in the provinces. Mr. Justice Laskin concluded
that "[a]ll that is certainly known is that the framers had large
plans for the new Dominion and they proposed a strong central
government with ample financial powers to carry the program
through.""2 But certainty goes no further. He also reminds us that
[Tihe framers ...could not foresee the revolutionary economic
and social changes that have since taken place and could have had
no intention at all concerning them. . . . [Intentions cannot
provide answers for many of the questions which agitate us...
for the simple reason that the conditions out of which present
difficulties arise were not even remotely considered as possibili-
ties. 3
*6 MacDonald, The Privy Council and the Canadians Constitution, 29 CAN. B. REv. 1021
(1951) [hereinafter cited as MacDonald]; see also McWhinney, Legal Theory and Philosophy
of Law in Canada, in CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE 1 (E. McWhinney ed. 1958).
62 B. LASKIN, CANADIAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAw 11 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as LASKIN].
' Id. at 11-12.
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Thus the constitution has to be continually made, or remade, to
settle new controversies.
Pigeon advances a much more pro-provincial rights argument.
The British North America Act, he says, is "the expression of a
compromise between many men holding different and opposed
viewpoints. When agreement was reached on a text, are we justified
in assuming that agreement was also reached on intentions?" 4 The
question is, of course, rhetorical.
Of course, not all of the constitutional cases involved the federal
division of powers, but as these caused the most controversy we shall
deal primarily with them. The majority deal with one or the other
of the major clauses of Sections 91 and 92 of the British North
America Act, the first of which lists the powers of the central govern-
ment, and the second lists those of the provincial authorities. Be-
tween the two it was evidently intended that "the whole area of self-
government" would be covered, with any lacunae left to be filled in
by the coverall clause vesting in the national government the power
to "make laws for the Peace, Order and Good Government," 5 a
clause as outstanding in its ambiguity as the American general wel-
fare clause. The general intent was clear enough-that national
power was to extend to all areas not given to the provinces in Section
92. But upon investigation it becomes apparent that this neatness
of classification is a grand illusion, for most of the specific powers
in Section 92 can conflict in given instances with those in Section
91, and vice versa. As Laskin trenchantly remarks, "there is nothing
in human affairs which corresponds to the neat logical divisions
found in the constitution." 6
With whatever preconceptions the Judicial Committee ap-
proached Canadian constitutional cases, a general bias in favor of
national power was obviously not among them. The Committee has,
on the contrary, been accused of taking a rigid conceptualistic
stance, suitable perhaps to statutory interpretation but not to the
construction of fundamental constitutional provisions. Evaluation
of this criticism is hampered by the fact that opinions tend to vary
strongly, depending on the commentator's agreement or disagree-
", Pigeon, The Meaning of Provincial Autonomy, 29 CAN. B. REv. 1126, 1128 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as Pigeon].
11 British North America Act, 1867, 30 Vict., c.3, § 91, reprinted in E. CAMERON, THE
CANADIAN CONSTITUTION, AS INTERPRETED BY THE JUDICIAL COMMITrEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL IN
ITS JUDGMENTS 55-56 (1915) [hereinafter cited as CAMERON].
u LASKIN, supra note 62, at 4.
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ment with the actual decisions. MacDonald, for instance, says that
"such a restrictive and conceptualistic view of its function is as
remarkable in a court of last resort as its results have been bad ...
for constitutions are not intended to be construed in vacuo but as
living instruments of government." 7 However true, these comments
do not add up to a guide for decision. Laskin remarks, more temper-
ately, that court rules in England
required the Privy Council to consider the literal meaning of the
words used without any conjecture as to the intentions of those who
framed the Quebec and London resolutions. The Privy Council as
a court was not free to consider historical evidence about inten-
tions but was bound to restrict itself to a consideration of what
may be called, by contrast, legal evidence.68
Here again there is disagreement. The Report of the Quebec Royal
Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems claimed that
"Privy Council decisions carry out the intent without which Quebec
would not have agreed to the British North America Act." 9 Pigeon
denies that Judicial Committee decisions have been based on nar-
row and technical considerations:
[They proceed] from a much higher view. . . .They recognize
the implicit fluidity of any constitution by resting distinctions on
questions of degree. At the same time they firmly uphold the fun-
damental principle of provincial autonomy: they staunchly refuse
to let our federal constitution be changed gradually, by one device
or another, to a legislative union. In doing so they are preserving
the essential condition of the Canadian confederation.
70
With disagreement so universal, one wonders if everyone is dis-
cussing the same constitution. But whoever was "right" in this con-
troversy, the adverse critics seem likely to be the eventual victors;
Canada abolished the right of appeal to the Privy Council in 1949,
and the Canadian Supreme Court apparently began almost imme-
diately to "restore" the critics' view of Canadian federalism. 7'
The British North America Act assigns exclusive powers to the
central government and to the provinces, with any "residual" pow-
ers allotted to the national government under the "peace, order and
'7 MacDonald, supra note 61, at 1030.
" LASKIN, supra note 62, at 5.
n Id. at 15-16.
T Pigeon, supra note 64, at 1135.
" LASKIN, supra note 62, at 83-84.
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good government" clause. For this reason, when a national act is
challenged constitutionally, the first thing the courts must do is look
at Section 92 to see whether the matter is within the exclusive
provincial power. If it is not, the act is automatically valid. If it is
within Section 92, the matter becomes more complicated, for this
fact does not in itself invalidate the act. The judges must look to
Section 91 to see whether there is a national power from which the
challenged act could fairly find support. If there were, this national
power would overbear the provincial power.
When provincial acts are challenged the judges must look first at
Section 92, for if the act does not fall within that section it is auto-
matically invalid. If it does come within Section 92, however, it is
not necessarily valid, for it could still run afoul of a Section 91
provision which would take precedence. The major difficulty stems
from the "peace, order and good government" clause, for if taken
literally it could overbear all of Section 92 and render the provincial
powers nugatory. But another difficulty is posed by the existence in
Section 92 of a clause almost as ambiguous, i.e., clause 16, which
reserves to the provinces "all matters of a merely local or private
nature in the province."72
By 1925, under the influence of Lords Watson and Haldane, these
questions had more or less stabilized in such a way that the "peace,
order and good government" clause had affirmative meaning only
when a law fell outside the enumerations of both Sections 91 and
92, or when the law was an attempt to cope with an extreme, and
temporary, emergency. While these principles were relaxed in the
direction of expanded national power after Haldane's death, they
were still largely in effect when the economic recovery legislation of
Prime Minister Bennett came before the Privy Council in the late
1930's and 1940's, and even when appeal was abolished in 1949. In
any case, the guidelines were of little assistance in the decision of
cases which involved direct conflict between the provisions of Sec-
tion 91 and those of Section 92.
As to these latter cases, Lord Sankey's judgment in In re Regula-
tion and Control of Aeronautics in Canada3 in 1932 laid out four
principles: (1) legislation coming strictly under Section 91 was pre-
sumed to be valid unless it "trenched upon" matters assigned to the
" British North America Act 1867, 30 Vict., c.3, § 92; reprinted in CAMERON, supra note
65, at 56.
73 [1932] A.C. 54 (P.C.).
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provinces under Section 92; (2) general legislation enacted under
the aegis of Section 91 was to be "strictly confined to such matters
as are unquestionably of national interest and importance, and
must not trench upon. . . section 92. . .unless these matters have
attained such dimensions as to affect the body politic of the Domin-
ion;'' (3) the Dominion had the power to legislate on matters
which, though otherwise left to the provinces, are "necessarily inci-
dental" to effective legislation under the first principle; and (4)
there were some concurrent areas in which either government might
legislate, but if the provincial legislation conflicted with federal
legislation, the national law was to prevail.
This set of guidelines was enunciated after Haldane's death, and
the Privy Council did not drastically change them later. A look at
the "Canadian New Deal" cases may illustrate this point, if one
adds a fifth principle which Lord Sankey did not mention; that is,
that provincial legislation cannot stand, even if it is within Section
92 and does not conflict with existing national legislation, if it is
found to be "in pith and substance" in relation to a power granted
to the national government in Section 91.
Apparently, six cases of the New Deal period were decided upon
the basis of the first of the above principles. A federal farm credit
law was upheld as a valid national regulation based upon the power
over bankruptcy and insolvency, against the argument that it
trenched upon provincial property and civil rights powers.7 5 An act
which made unfair trade practices criminal was upheld as a valid
criminal statute even though it was argued that it invaded a provin-
cial legislative field.76 Later, a second federal trade practices act was
upheld on similar grounds." On the other hand, the Judicial Com-
mittee felt that a treaty may create an obligation on the part of the
national government to legislate pursuant to it, but if the field of
legislation is constitutionally reserved to the provinces the mere fact
of the existence of the treaty does not increase the power of the
national government. A minimum wage and maximum hours act
was therefore deprived of effect. 71 A federal natural products mar-
7, This principle was apparently applicable to the subject of the case in which Lord Sankey
was writing, the control and regulation of airflight, a matter which could hardly have been
enumerated in section 91.
"' Attorney-General of Brit. Colum. v. Attorney General of Can., [1937] A.C. 391 (P.C.).
7' Attorney-General of Brit. Colum. v. Attorney-General of Can., [1937] A.C. 368 (P.C.).
7 Attorney-General of Ont. v. Attorney-General of Can., [1937] A.C. 405 (P.C.).
Attorney-General of Can. v. Attorney-General of Ont., [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.).
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keting law was struck down because the Committee felt that it
"trenched upon" provincial power in the field of property and civil
rights." Finally, a maximum hours law, as applied to a railway-
owned hotel, was struck down; the Judicial Committee felt that
even though the railway was undoubtedly under national control, its
ancillary businesses were provincial.80
Under the second principle, regarding general Section 91 legisla-
tion, an act setting up a federal compulsory unemployment insur-
ance scheme was invalidated on the grounds that it invaded an
exclusive provincial competence without justification of an overrid-
ing national concern or emergency.8" The third principle of implied
power was applied in a case challenging the powers of the national
railway board. The Judicial Committee felt that, even though the
property and civil rights powers of the provinces might be en-
croached upon, the law was necessary in the securing of effective
railway administration, a national concern." Apparently no case fell
squarely within the fourth principle regarding concurrent legisla-
tion.
The fifth principle was responsible for three provincial acts being
upheld against "pith and substance" arguments; a British Colum-
bia dairy licensing law, 3 a British Columbia tax on fuel oil consum-
ers (held to be a direct tax),8 ' and an Ontario law imposing a debt
moratorium which could obviously have been regarded as "in pith
and substance" a law in relation to insolvency.85
But other provincial laws were invalidated. The Alberta Debt
Adjustment Act of 1937 was, in contradiction to the Ontario act
above, struck down. 8 Two laws were found unconstitutional for
being "in pith and substance" in relation to "interest," a matter
within exclusive national competence. 7 The Judicial Committee
also found the Social Credit legislation of Alberta entirely unconsti-
Attorney-General of Brit. Colum. v. Attorney-General of Can., [1937] A.C. 377 (P.C.).
Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. v. Attorney-General of Brit. Colum., [1950] A.C. 122 (P.C.).
Attorney-General of Can. v. Attorney-General of Ont., [1937] A.C. 355 (P.C.).
" Canadian Elec. Ass'n v. Canadian Nat'l Ry., [19341 A.C. 551 (P.C.).
Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Prods. Bd., (P.C.) (Canada).
Attorney-General of Brit. Colum. v. Kingcane Navigation Co., [1934] A.C. 45 (P.C.).
Abitibi Power & Paper Co. v. Montreal Trust Co., [1943] A.C. 536 (P.C.) (Canada).
Attorney-General of Alberta v. Attorney General of Can., [1943] A.C. 356 (P.C.).
Attorney-General of Sask. v. Attorney General of Can., [1949] A.C. 110 (P.C.) (a Sas-
katchewan crop failure relief act); Board of Trustees of the Lethbridge N. Irrigation Dist. v.
Independent Order of Foresters, [1940] A.C. 513 (P.C.) (Can.) (Alberta act reducing the
interest on securities issued or guaranteed by the province.).
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tutional because the credit sections of the law were interpreted as
being properly within the federal banking power and the remainder
of the act was felt to be inseverable from the defective provisions. 5
This is a catalogue of economic recovery legislation, both federal
and provincial, appealed to the Privy Council. There were only fif-
teen cases concerning this legislation, six of which involved provin-
cial legislation and seven of which upheld the national power. The
figures are unremarkable in themselves, but it may be argued that
the implications of the eight cases upholding provincial power went
far beyond the cases themselves and in effect made it impossible
for the national government to deal with the economic emergency.
Even if this is true, it leaves open the question of whether the consti-
tution was properly interpreted; for one cannot assume-despite
one's own desires-that a constitution contains within it all that the
wise and prudent, many years later, might wish to find there. Thus,
most constitutions provide for amendment.
It is also remarkable that the Privy Council in most of these cases
affirmed the judgment of the Canadian trial courts. Of the ten cases
appealed from the Supreme Court, eight resulted in clear affirm-
ances, one involved an even split of the Canadian justices, and the
tenth varied, without reversing, the decision of the Supreme Court.
The provincial courts from which the other five cases came were
affirmed twice, reversed twice, and reversed in part once. This
seems to lend credence to Eggleston's argument that the courts
followed the trend of opinion in Canada rather than using an arid
conceptualism, and that the Privy Council for the most part just
"went along." 9 Nevertheless, there exists a strong possibility that
the Supreme Court was itself doing what it felt was required by
previous decisions of the Judicial Committee, or merely applying its
own brand of conceptualism." But conceptualism, as many writers
have remarked, in an effort to avert judicial policymaking succeeds
only in making the policy choices subconscious or inarticulate,
thereby preventing "any very conscious, intelligent balancing of
[the] interests" presented in constitutional cases.'
Attorney-General of Alberta v. Attorney General of Can., [19471 A.C. 503 (P.C.).
W. EGGLESTON, THE ROAD TO NATIONHOOD 35-39 (1946).
0 This appears to be the essence of McWhinney's comment on the subject, in which he
remarks on "the pervasive, if subtle, influence of a common legal education and training, and
a common system of professional organization throughout the Commonwealth Countries." E.
MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD 27 (3d ed. 1965), [hereinafter
cited as McWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REvIEW].
"1 Id. at 29-30.
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V. AUSTRALIA
Although in 1900 the Australian states had their own brand of
particularism, it was not complicated by an ethnic rivalry since the
states were all English, with a common law legal system prevading
them. They were also able to agree upon a central government with
rather limited powers; thus, they produced a constitution with fewer
of the ambivalences that characterized that of Canada.
This being true, they had no need to rely on the Privy Council to
settle federal disputes; they had settled many of them already and
had confidence in their ability to continue to do so. They also had
before them thirty years of Canadian experience, which seemed to
provide two lessons: write your constitution carefully and do not let
the Privy Council interfere. It was, in fact, this Australian attitude
which led to the great struggle with England over the adoption of
the Australian constitution. The Colonial Office, headed by Joseph
Chamberlain, felt that the strict limitations on Privy Council ap-
peals were subversive of the Imperial system. Prolonged discussion
led to a compromise of sorts with the Australians achieving most of
their goals." Questions involving the federal system ("inter se"
questions in the constitution) could be appealed only from the state
courts (there are no trial level national courts) to the High Court of
Australia and to the Judicial Committee only with the High Court's
permission, which has very seldom been given. Other constitutional
questions could be appealed to the Committee in similar fashion to
other dependencies.
While even such a restricted right of appeal has produced a rather
surprising number of cases, the Privy Council has never been able
to play the significant role in Australian constitutional development
that it played in Canada. Its decisions can be more easily negated,
since Australians can, albeit with some difficulty, amend their own
constitution. Purely state questions can also be appealed to the
Committee if they involve only the state constitution. However,
three states have British-type unwritten constitutions with parlia-
mentary supremacy; Queensland, New South Wales and Tasmania.
This somewhat reduces the potential for constitutional cases.
However, until recently, the influence of British decisions was
perhaps greater than in Canada in nonconstitutional areas. This is
" DeGaris, The Colonial Office and the Constitution Bill, in ESSAYS IN AUSTRALIAN
FEDERATION 104-17 (A. Martin ed. 1969).
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because, as in New Zealand, Australian courts paid great deference
to all British court decisions. Professor Paton remarks, as late as
1952, that the Australian courts almost always follow House of
Lords decisions, and often those of the British Court of Appeals as
well. While admitting that "theoretically no decision of the House
of Lords is binding," Paton goes on to remark that "since this tri-
bunal follows its own decisions a refusal by Australian courts to
follow it would produce a permanent divergence between the law in
England and Australia." 3 He does not indicate why Australians
should be concerned about such divergence. Thus Australian law
has been shaped to an unknown extent by British judges who were
ruling in other and vastly dissimilar circumstances.
It is also true that the more ordinary type of nonconstitutional
private law cases may still be appealed to the Privy Council under
the same rules as before independence. These cases have not dec-
lined very much in number in recent years; 23 were decided in the
decade 1962-1971. Thus both indirectly through following British
precedent, and directly through decisions of the Judicial Commit-
tee, the development of the general law of Australia (which, as in
the United States, is largely state law) has been both greatly and
fundamentally influenced by British judges. These judges have
shown a good deal of deference to special conditions as reflected in
Australian lower court decisions. The development of land law in an
arid and largely unsettled country, for instance, seems not to have
been notably hampered by the fact that English judges live in such
a different physical environment. Any inhibition of development
could be explained by the excessive deference paid by Australian
courts to British precedents, a matter which can be changed by the
Australians themselves and can hardly be discrediting to British
courts, much less the Judicial Committee.
British preconceptions also account for the fact that the Austra-
lian judges have, to an even more extreme degree than their Cana-
dian confreres, adopted a highly legalistic approach to their consti-
tution. They generally seem to regard it as an ordinary statute, to
' Paton, Reception of the Common Law, in THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA: THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION 12 (G. Paton ed. 1952). But see the recent case of
Australian Consolidated Press, Ltd. v. Uren, [19691 1 A.C. 590, in which the Judicial Com-
mittee upheld the High Court's refusal to follow a House of Lords ruling, saying that "in
matters of domestic or internal significance the need for uniformity is not compelling." It
should also be noted that in 1963 the House of Lords deserted its former rule which required
it to maintain its own precedents.
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be applied without benefit of either scientific or policy-oriented
types of evidence, and without any presumption of constitution-
ality. This emphasis on a law of concepts has been carried to an
extreme which even a favorable Australian commentator has called
"refined or ludicrous according to taste."94 Another writer refers to
it as "the lawyer's unawareness that he is taking sides on burning
questions."95 Since this criticism is similar to that widely voiced by
Canadians about the Privy Council, one may conclude that it is a
result of the use in the Commonwealth of "prevailing methods of
legal education in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth
countries . . . [which fall] far short of giving the legal decision-
maker the broad training in the social sciences that is so necessary
in handling the complex public law issues of present-day society."',
In Australia the result of conceptualism in the courts has been to
render constitutional decisions socially and politically unrealistic.
More specifically, since conceptualism involves decisionmaking on
the basis of "inarticulate major premises" of which both the public
and the judges themselves are often aware, it has resulted in the use
of Manchester liberal economic preconceptions which, as in the
cases concerning Section 92 (the so-called "free-trade" section), do
not make good legal sense. The High Court has developed this con-
stitutional provision into an analogue of the old American substan-
tive due process doctrines. One should confess at this point, how-
ever, that judicial preconceptions are not necessarily conservative;
recent American cases such as those regarding birth control and
abortion demonstrate that conceptualism can be made to serve lib-
eral (or at least "libertarian") preconceptions as well as laissez-faire
ones. 7 The Australian decision invalidating the Communist Party
Dissolution Act of 1950 illustrates the same point. In any event, as
Professor Sawer concludes, Australian judges
all fall into the category of what . . . American [jurimetricians]
call "dogmatic conservatives." They try to decide cases by formal
inference from a limited set of premises found in the Constitution
and in the decisions of the Privy Council and the High Court, and
, G. SAWER, AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM IN THE COURTS 29 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SAWER].
" McWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 90, at 95.
"Id.
'7 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth, [1951] 83 C.L.R. 1. See MCWHINNEY,
JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 90, at 81.
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in a high proportion of cases-increasing with the volume of pre-
cedents-they succeed.9
Whether their "success" results in good decisions or bad depends
more on whether one likes the decisions than on one's response to
the approach utilized.
Constitutional cases appealed to the Judicial Committee from the
Australian states before federation were fairly numerous, although
their continuing vitality in the twentieth century is doubtful. The
bulk of them came from the oldest and largest colony, New South
Wales. These decided such points as the following: a judge cannot
be dismissed by the Governor-in-Council without being allowed a
hearing; 00 the ordinary civil servant may be dismissed at pleasure
by the Governor-General, without right of appeal to the Privy Coun-
cil;10' despite an English parliamentary act making English law as
of 1828 applicable to the colony, the legislature can adopt by its own
act English laws passed after that date, and the death of a sovereign
makes no difference in the status of such laws; 0 there is a Crown
prerogative, vested in the Judicial Committee, to hear appeals in
criminal cases; 13 a colonial legislature is not a delegate of the British
Parliament, and therefore can pass customs laws which entrust the
actual imposition of the duty to the executive; 104 the legislature has
the power to repeal its own acts; 105 and a member of the legislature
can be suspended only under the rules applicable in England as of
the date of their adoption in New South Wales. 06 Several of these
decisions were of importance, of course, in the development of full
self-government, but they cover matters which would be taken for
granted in later times.
Cases from other Australian colonies were similar in nature and
effect, if not so numerous. The Victoria legislature was upheld in an
exercise of the power to cite for contempt, under Imperial legislation
and also under its own constitution.' Queensland had a case ruling
SAWER, supra note 94, at 75.
Willis v. Gipps, 13 Eng. Rep. 536 (P.C. 1846) (New South Wales).
101 Ex parte Robertson, 14 Eng. Rep. 704 (P.C. 1857) (New South Wales).
102 Devine v. Holloway, 15 Eng. Rep. 314 (P.C. 1861) (New South Wales).
* Attorney-General, New South Wales v. Bertrand, [1865-1867] L.R. 1 P.C. 520. The
Judicial Committee decided that the colonial Supreme Court could not grant a new trial in
a felony case under the English law then prevailing in the colony.
10, Powell v. Apollo Candle Co., [1885] 10 App. Cas. 282 (P.C.) (New South Wales).
lOS Harris v. Davies, [1885] 10 App. Cas. 279 (P.C.) (New South Wales).
, Barton v. Taylor, [1886] 11 App. Cas. 197 (P.C.) (New South Wales).
07 Dill v. Murphy, 15 Eng. Rep. 784 (P.C. 1864) (Colony of Victoria); Speaker of Legislative
Assembly v. Glass, [1869-1871] L.R. 3 P.C. 560.
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that a legislator was not disqualified "by reason of his having en-
tered into a contract . . . for and on account of the public serv-
ice." 108 The Queensland constitution was also held to allow Privy
Council review of whether a legislative seat had become vacant.'
In addition there were two cases from Tasmania, one involving the
Governor and Council's power to remove a judge,"0 and another
holding that the legislature has no inherent power to cite for con-
tempt for an act committed outside the legislative chamber."'
Such cases under state constitutions have continued to come to
the Judicial Committee since 1900, although they are not frequent.
However, since Australian writers frequently ignore them, it may be
useful to mention them briefly. Two of them involved the validity
of provisions of state death duty laws, under which the states at-
tempted to collect for assets held outside the state. In the first, it
was held that New South Wales could not constitutionally collect
such duties on property situated outside the state,"12 while in the
other cases it was held that shareholdings held outside the same
state are dutiable."3
The Judicial Committee, in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v.
Irving"' held that cases pending at the time of the adoption of the
Australian Constitution Act could properly be heard by the Com-
mittee on direct appeal, even though similar later cases could not
be appealed. When it heard the case on the merits, the Committee
ruled in favor of the new national government, holding that a uni-
form federal excise tax can be enacted preceding uniform customs
duties, and that such a tax does not discriminate between states." 5
Two cases took up questions of the legislature's power to regulate
its own affairs, similar to some earlier cases. The New South Wales
legislature was held to have power to suspend a member in the
interest of maintaining "orderly conduct" in the chamber, even
though a judicial verdict on a previous alleged offence was pend-
ing."6 The other case, also from New South Wales, questioned the
I" Miles v. McIlwraith, [1883] 8 App. Cas. 120 (P.C.) (Queensland).
Attorney-General, Queensland v. Gibbon, [1887] 12 App. Cas. 442 (P.C.).
" Montagu v. Lt. Governor of Van Dieman's Land, 13 Eng. Rep. 773 (P.C. 1849).
Fenton v. Hampton, 14 Eng. Rep. 727 (P.C. 1858) (Van Dieman's Land).
12 Johnson v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties, [1956] A.C. 331 (P.C.) (New South Wales).
"' Thompson v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties, [1969] 1 A.C. 320 (P.C.) (New South
Wales).
"' [1905] A.C. 369 (P.C.) (Queensland).
II Id.
" Harnett v. Crick, [1908] A.C. 470 (P.C.) (New South Wales).
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validity of an amendment to the state election laws. The Judicial
Committee decided that the legislature had the power to make its
upper house an elective body. Such an amendment could properly
be submitted to the electorate in a referendum and did not infringe
upon Crown rights. The significance of this lies in the fact that the
upper chamber had begun, as in most British colonies, as the Gover-
nor's Council; therefore, a distinct change in Crown rights was being
made by legislative act.' 7
Finally, there have been two recent challenges to Queensland's
motor vehicle laws. In one case the license law for commercial vehi-
cles was upheld against the charge that its retroactive effect was
invalid."'8 The other challenged the state's power to enact the law
at all. The Committee found that the law properly falls within the
state's power to legislate for the "peace, welfare and good govern-
ment," emphasizing in its judgment the "plenary" power of the
states in areas where there is no conflict with national power."'
Although the state cases reviewed above are not numerous, they
do involve constitutional issues which are quite important, and they
demonstrate as well the continuing vitality of direct appeal from the
states to the Judicial Committee, even under the restrictive Austra-
lian laws which attempt to force all constitutional cases into the
High Court. 2 1
Most cases, however, come to the Privy Council (if at all) through
the High Court. These cases, which have often turned on interpreta-
tions either of federal grants of power under the Constitution Act
or the meaning of the provision that interstate trade shall be
"absolutely free," have been recently and ably analyzed by Profes-
sor Sawer and by other earlier writers, so that there seems little
point in reviewing them. They indicate that as late as 1970 the
Judicial Committee was still playing an important role in the inter-
pretation of the Australian Constitution, although it seems doubtful
that the Committee's judgments have, on the whole, been far differ-
ent from those favored by the majority of the High Court. There has
been some canvassing by Australian writers of the possibility of
abolishing appeal completely, but it seems unlikely that this will be
", Doyle v. Attorney-General, New South Wales, [1934] A.C. 511 (P.C.).
Western Transp. Pty., Ltd. v. Kropp, [1965] A.C. 914 (P.C.) (Queensland).
,, Cobb & Co. v. Kropp, [1967] A.C. 141 (P.C.) (Queensland).
' SAWER, supra note 94, at ch. 3.
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done soon unless the Committee should perform the unusual act of
reversing the High Court on some really fundamental matter.'
VI. NEW COLONIES
The accidents of time and culture have guaranteed that the Judi-
cial Committee could play no such role in the development of the
"new" colonies as it did in the old. Aside from various small posses-
sions such as Gibraltar and Mauritius, the new colonies are defined
as those which came under British control during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. Typically they were not populated by Bri-
tish (or even white) settlers, although the British (or other whites)
may now compose important minorities in some, such as South
Africa and Rhodesia. The languages and customs were not British,
and the cultures predated British arrival. Some had established
legal systems of a relatively advanced nature, for example the Dutch
of South Africa, the French of Mauritius, and the Muslims of Zanzi-
bar. Others had long-established customary systems of law which
the British felt bound to observe, such as the tribal landholding
customs of West Africa. For various reasons, most of these areas
were, in greater or lesser degree, inhospitable to British political
institutions, so that when they attained independence they did not
precisely duplicate British parliamentarianism nor hold to British
ideas of the rule of law. For this reason, even important Privy Coun-
cil decisions are likely to have little present significance. Finally, in
most cases the areas were not under British control long enough or
thoroughly enough for English ideas and institutions to pervade
them with even the depth that was the case in India.
After achieving independence, relatively few of these colonies
have retained appeal to the Judicial Committee for many years.
This may be due partly to the fact that almost all of them are
unitary rather than federal states; significantly, federal Malaysia
has kept the right of appeal and used it quite frequently. Even
where appeal is retained, constitutions seldom seem to have bills of
rights or other "entrenched" provisions, being British enough to
resist this development. Many of them, in addition, have evolved
into military autocracies in which constitutional provisions are
changeable at the will of the current regime. Consequently, consti-
tutional cases appealed to the Committee are few; the bulk of the
"2 Id.; see also Nettheim, The Power to Abolish Appeals to the Privy Council from Austra-
lian Courts, 39 AuSm. L.J. 39 (1965).
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cases involve private law.
It is probably in the area of private law, then, that one must look
for the major continuing influence of the Judicial Committee. Here
the attempt to create a body of law common to the entire Empire
was especially noticeable, even though it went hand in hand with a
contrary tendency to use rules of local law or custom where it
seemed desirable. A few examples will serve to illustrate these
points.
For the Dutch-settled portions of South Africa, for instance, the
Committee consistently applied as best it could the Romano-Dutch
law as it had developed in the colonies. This meant using South
African cases as precedents even when they dated to a period before
the British conquest. 22 This theme recurred in many cases. The
rules of Chinese marriage were observed in appropriate cases from
Malaya, 123 even though English law was applied in other cases, espe-
cially when wills and succession law were involved. 2 In Malta, the
ancient Code of Rohan was held applicable in several succession law
cases. 125
Hong Kong for some reason has had practically no family law
cases appealed to the Judicial Committee. Most of the fairly numer-
ous appeals have been in the area of business law. Here, for quite
understandable reasons, English law was uniformly applied. Eng-
lish common law on the use of subpoenas was held to apply in
Nigeria, 6 but polygamy was held to be legal as consistent with local
custom.' 27 Additionally a chief was found to retain his traditional
right to evict a man from the tribal compound. 2s
In One case in which this was made explicit, involving damages for breach of contract, was
Pearl Assurance Co. v. Union of South Africa, [19341 A.C. 570 (P.C.).
in Cheang Thye Phin v. Tan Ah Loy, [1920] A.C. 369 (P.C.) (Penang); Khoo Hooi Leong
v. Khoo Hean Kwee, [1926] A.C. 529 (P.C.) (Penang).
I" Yeap Cheah Neo v. Ong. Cheng Neo, [1874-18751 App. Cas. 381 (P.C.) (Penang);
Ganapathy Pillay v. Alamaloo, [1929] A.C. 462 (P.C.) (Selangor); Khoo Hooi Leong v. Khoo
Cheong Yeok, [1930] A.C. 346 (P.C.) (Penang); Leong v. Chye, [1955] A.C. 648 (P.C.)
(Federation of Malaya).
2 D'Amico v. Trigona, [1888] 13 App. Cas. 806 (P.C.) (Malta); Desain v. Viani, [19251
A.C. 416 (P.C.) (Malta); Strickland v. Strickland, [1908] A.C. 551 (P.C.) (Malta); Bugeja
v. Camilleri, [1869-1871] L.R. 3 P.C. 258.
I" Shorunke v. The King, [1946] A.C. 316 (P.C.) (Nigeria).
12' Bamgbose v. Daniel, [1955] A.C. 107 (P.C.) (Nigeria); Mawji v. The Queen, [1957]
A.C. 126 (P.C.) (Tanganyika); Coleman v. Shong, [1961] A.C. 481 (P.C.) (Ghana).
I" Inasa v. Oshodi, [1934] A.C. 99 (P.C.) (Nigeria). An excellent treatment of native
courts operating within and under a British legal framework, is given in L. FALLERS, LAW
WITHOUT PRECEDENT: LEGAL IDEAS IN ACTION IN THE COURTS OF COLONIAL BUSOGA (1969); see
also M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (1955).
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Perhaps the one case that best illustrates the attempt to tie the
Empire together involved, peculiarly enough, not English law but
Muslim law. The Committee held, first, that Muslim law is applica-
ble in relevant cases in Kenya, and secondly, that Committee deci-
sions on Muslim law in India are binding on the rest of the Empire
(thus including Kenya).129
The special concerns of a far-flung Empire are reflected in the
activities of some of the lower courts. The Supreme Court for China
and Japan (or, at times, China and Korea, or merely China) at
Shanghai apparently handled mostly admiralty and business cases
involving British subjects, as did the Supreme Consular Court of
Constantinople. Such cases were sometimes appealed to the Judi-
cial Committee.
The comparatively large number of criminal appeals received by
the Committee, in contrast to the almost complete absence of these
from the English-speaking colonies, is noteworthy. Perhaps this re-
sulted from a distrust of native judges or a feeling that even English
judges operating in the colonies might have trouble applying the
rule of law in native circumstances. Also, it may have stemmed from
the desire to ensure even-handed justice for natives.
Few cases explicitly raised racial issues, although it is probable
that the whole structure of law tended to favor white men. But two
cases illustrate both the limitations of a common law court and the
changes that may take place when both the men and the constitu-
tional situation are different. In Commissioner for Local Govern-
ment Lands and Settlement v. Kaderbhai,'1 a 1931 appeal, the
Committee held that the sale of town plots could legally be re-
stricted to whites in Kenya, even though they were Crown lands up
for public sale. Apparently feeling that an argument based on par-
liamentary supremacy was not enough, Lord Atkin went on to re-
mark that "questions of policy . . .are not matters for the legal
tribunal.''M But by 1970, in reference to an independent Sierra
Leone, the Committee in Akar v. Attorney General of Sierra Leone132
was emboldened to take a much more activist approach. It is impor-
tant to realize, however, that Sierra Leone had a written constitu-
10 Bakhshuwen v. Bakhshuwen, [1952] A.C. 1 (P.C.) (Kenya). In Egypt, Muslim law on
wills was held to govern if the persons involved are Muslims even though English. Bartlett
v. Bartlett, [1925] A.C. 377 (P.C.) (Egypt).
1- [1931] A.C. 652 (P.C.) (Kenya).
131 Id.
1' [1970] A.C. 853 (P.C.).
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tion which the Committee could apply. Even so, it was a rather
exceptional act of judicial statesmanship (even though it favored
whites) to hold that the constitutional provisions covered the new
law, especially since the law was in form an amendment to the
constitution. The law was an attempt to restrict citizenship to per-
sons descended from a native African father, and the Committee
held that it violated a basic clause of the Constitution barring dis-
crimination; the amendment was "essentially a racial one" and thus
invalid.'3 Lord Guest took advantage of the newly granted privilege
of dissent, using an old-fashioned positivistic stance from which to
accuse the majority of looking behind the face of the statute to its
purpose. Additionally, he felt that the Committee had gone beyond
its competence in claiming that there were no special circumstances
which could justify the law. While one admires the courage of the
majority, it is nevertheless true that, for an independent state like
Sierra Leone, such decisions are the kind most likely to lead to the
abolition of Privy Council appeal.
Aside from the above, the Privy Council has handled few signifi-
cant constitutional cases. For instance, one older case raised an
issue as to when Britain had gained territorial sovereignty over Bri-
tish Honduras. Although the area was not formally annexed until
1862, the Committee held, on the basis of royal land grants, that
actual sovereignty was gained as early as 1817.'14 In a recent case
involving freedom of the press, the Committee found that the post-
independence constitution of Malta did not permit the government
to prohibit government employees from having copies of the Voice
of Malta in their offices.'3 5 Nigeria had five constitutional cases
appealed, which was more than any other jurisdiction, but they
were all pre-independence and are no longer applicable.
No doubt the most famous constitutional issue treated by the
Committee in recent times stemmed from the unilateral declaration
of independence by Rhodesia, which has still (as of 1975) not been
accepted by the British government, due to Rhodesia's white su-
premacy policy. The case, Madzimbamuto v. Landner-Burke and
George, 3 grew out of a detention order issued by the Smith regime.
In court, the Rhodesian officials claimed that even if their authority
133 Id.
13 Attorney-General of British Honduras v. Bristowe, [1881] 6 App. Cas. 143 (P.C.).
13 Oliver v. Buttiqieg, [1967] 1 A.C. 115 (P.C.) (Malta).
13 11969] 1 A.C. 645 (P.C.) (Rhodesia).
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was strictly illegal, they constituted the only government existing
de facto in Rhodesia and their orders therefore were valid. The
Judicial Committee, with Lord Pearce dissenting, held that the
lawful sovereign was still the Queen-in-(United Kingdom) Parlia-
ment, and that the de facto rulers did not constitute a legal govern-
ment.'37 Although it was the only decision an English court could
have reached, it was obviously unrealistic and unenforceable with-
out war, and therefore presents a classic illustration of the weak-
nesses of an appellate court external to the jurisdiction from which
the cases stem. The Rhodesian courts, somewhat reluctantly, took
the position that if they did not enforce the orders of the Smith
regime there would be no law and no courts in Rhodesia, and that
they were therefore constrained to act as though it was a legal gov-
ernment. Consequently, the Committee's decision was never obeyed
in Rhodesia.
Another important series of cases came from Malaya. In one, the
Committee held that under the Malayan Constitution, police could
only be discharged by the appointing official, and that the process
of discharge required notice and hearing.'38 The latter holding was
based explicitly on a concept of natural justice-a pronounced
change in the direction of activism perhaps reflecting the activist
tendencies of Lords Denning and Devlin, both of whom sat for the
case. This emphasis was repeated a few years later, but with an
entirely different set of judges sitting.'39 In a less activist mood, the
Committee (after a complicated set of maneuvers in Malaya) held
that the dismissal of the Chief Minister of Sarawak was valid, be-
cause he had been dismissed by the central government under a
declaration of a state of emergency. The Committee held that the
appellant had failed to prove that there was no emergency, and that
it was his duty to do so.14
VII. CONCLUSION
This treatment of the work of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council has necessarily resulted in a shallow furrow plowed in al-
most virgin ground. The true effects of the Committee's work may
never actually be known, outside the comparatively easy constitu-
137 Id.
t3 Kanda v. Malaya, (1962] A.C. 322 (P.C.).
' Maradana Mosque Trustees v. Mahmud, [19671 1 A.C. 13 (P.C.) (Ceylon).
Ningkan v. Malaysia, [1970] A.C. 379 (P.C.).
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tional sphere, unless scholars with the interest, time, and resources
devote themselves to more specific issues than this article addresses.
What kind of law do the former colonies now use regarding wills and
inheritances, and how much does it resemble the Committee's
rulings? The same question could be asked of other areas such as
family law, business law, criminal law, and other fields.
It is true, of course, that the Committee still sits. It now receives
around 30 to 40 appeals a year, mostly from Commonwealth nations
since there are few colonies left. Its role as a constitutional court is
no longer very important, since only Malaya, Ceylon and (occasion-
ally) Australia allow appeals involving such questions. Shortly even
these three may cease to do so. There are, however, cases of some
importance in other areas of law which still come to London from
these countries, and from New Zealand, Hong Kong, Sierra Leone,
a few other African jurisdictions, Fiji, and some of the West Indian
area mini-nations. Other former and present possessions send few,
if any, cases, even when appeal is still technically possible. No
recent cases have come from the Channel Islands or the Isle of
Man,"' and the populations of such territories as Gibraltar, the
Falkland Islands, or St. Helena are too small to give rise to many
cases in any event.
Still of s6 me importance, the Judicial Committee is nevertheless
only a shadow of its former self, and quite obviously the great days
of its influence, from about 1880 to 1950, are gone forever. If indeed
its influence lingers on, it is difficult to discern in most legal fields.
Within its limitations it seems to have done a creditable and useful
job. Empires are fragile things at best, and seem to be out of style,
so there is not even the satisfaction of knowing that the British
example may be of use in the organization of other similar situa-
tions-that is, barring the rise of some sort of effective worldwide
legal organization.
"I The most recent case from Guernsey came in 1902; from Jersey in 1954 (one of very few
in the twentieth century); and from the Isle of Man in 1910.
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